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 1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering studies of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964), human capital (hereinafter, 
HC) has become a significant factor in the economics literature, and it is afforded a key role in 
neo-classical endogenous growth models. The influential studies of Lucas (1988), Romer 
(1990), and Barro (1991) identify the accumulation of HC as the main source of productivity 
growth, while a related research line reports that a large stock of HC makes it easier for a 
country to absorb new products and ideas discovered elsewhere (Nelson & Phelps 1966). These 
perspectives assume education to be a direct input into production, and consider growth rates to 
be related to increasing endowments of various inputs. Thus, changes in the HC stock are a 
decisive explanatory factor of growth (Hanushek & Kimko 2000; Mankiw et al. 1992). Here, as 
Becker (1964) suggested, education is an investment of time and foregone earnings in exchange 
for higher rates of return at a later date. Two main mechanisms account for the accumulation of 
HC, namely, schooling (Lucas 1988) and learning-by-doing (Arrow 1962). 
Seen from another perspective, the skill-biased technological change hypothesis affirms 
that there is considerable complementarity between new technologies and skilled labour. 
Hence, the recent increase in demand for highly skilled workers in developed countries is 
mainly driven by technological change (Acemoglu 1998; Piva et al. 2005). There is, therefore, 
a constant upskilling of the workforce across developed countries. 
In this setting, HC is not just a key element for economic growth but at the same time it 
is experiencing a rise in demand. While we are aware of several studies that discuss the effects 
of HC accumulation on, for example, wage premiums in a microeconomic context (Mincer, 
1974; Moretti 2004; Ciccone & Peri 2006), regional income disparities (Coulombe & Tremblay 
2007), regional development (Florida et al. 2008), regional productivity (Ramos et al. 2010), 
regional employment (Mollick & Mora 2010) and the level of economic activity (Abel & Gabe 
2010)1, relatively little is known about the factors that determine the production of human 
capital. 
Because the creation of HC is one of the most important channels via which universities 
positively affect regional development (Audretsch et al., 2005; Acosta et al., 2009), it is 
interesting to analyse the factors that determine its production, and the strategic role played by 
universities in this process. 
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 Table A3 in the appendix provides a review of recent studies on the relationship between regional development 
and human capital. 
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 The literature on Higher Education Institutions (hereinafter, HEIs) has been mainly 
concerned with distributional questions related to access and cost faced by different groups. 
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to model universities from other perspectives. Just and 
Huffman (2009) adopt a theoretical approach to model universities as behavioural institutions 
making decisions as regards tuition rates, research and teaching incentives, that follow from 
utility maximization subject to production technology and resource/budget constraints. 
From an empirical perspective, the estimation of university efficiency has been a highly 
fertile field. For instance, Archibald and Feldman (2008) and Johnes (2006) use non-parametric 
techniques, while other papers employ parametric methodologies to analyse the presence of 
economies of scale and scope in the universities of various countries, e.g. the US (Groot et al. 
1991; Dundar & Lewis 1995), the UK (Glass et al. 1995; Izadi et al. 2002; G. Johnes & J. 
Johnes 2009), Japan (Hashimoto & Cohn 1997), China (Longlong et al. 2009), and Spain 
(Duch et al. 2010). 
As one of the most valued outcomes of the universities is degree completion, i.e. their 
contribution of high-skill workers to the labour force, much of the research has been concerned 
with estimating the impact of expenditure on student persistence and graduation rates (Ryan 
2004; Webber & Ehrenberg 2010), student engagement (Pike et al. 2006), and calculating the 
time-to-degree using duration models (Lassibille and Navarro 2011). Others, such as Berger 
and Kostal (2002), Perna and Titus (2004), Sá et al (2004), and Bedard and Herman (2008) 
analyse the determinants of enrolment in HEIs.   
We seek to contribute to this body of literature in a number of ways. First, while 
previous studies have tended to use cross section estimations, in this paper we adopt a panel 
model in order to better control for unobserved university characteristics2. By observing the 
same university over time, we can control the factors that make a university permanently more 
productive, e.g. in terms of graduate numbers. Second, the previous literature on graduation 
rates has mostly sought explanations at the individual (student) level; nonetheless, student 
achievements are equally attributable to the institutional or regional context. The possible 
impact of these factors is, therefore, considered in our analysis. 
Finally, we analyze a new case study, namely, the entire public university system in 
Spain. At least two traits of the Spanish case make it an interesting object of study. First, since 
the 1980s Spain has undergone fundamental economic and social changes. One of the most 
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 Besides controlling more effectively for unobserved heterogeneity, panel estimations are clearly more efficient 
than pooled ones, providing smaller standard errors and narrower confidence intervals. 
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 significant has been the substantial increase in the educational achievement of its labour force. 
Over the last four decades, the share of the economically active population attaining tertiary 
education rose from 1 to 9.4% (IVIE, 2010). Second, the Spanish university system is 
characterised by a number of specific features that make its analysis of particular interest. 
While in most OECD countries, public expenditure per student on HEIs declined between 1995 
and 2004, in Spain, it increased appreciably by 71%. In parallel, Spain was the only OECD 
country in which the absolute number of tertiary students fell (by 7%) between 2000 and 2005 
(OECD 2008).  
 Two main research questions have guided this study: (1) What factors determine the 
creation of human capital in universities? (2) How do regional characteristics affect university 
performance in terms of human-capital creation? 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the Spanish 
university framework. Section 3 provides details of the data and describes the empirical 
strategy. Section 4 reports our results. A robustness check using unconditional quantile 
regression is conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Spanish university framework  
Over the last three decades, the Spanish university system has increased three-fold in terms of 
the number of students enrolled3. The number of HEIs has evolved in parallel, with the 
establishment of universities in all the state’s cities and major towns. Along with this expansion 
process, a major transformation has taken place in the university system. Two reform measures 
introduced changes resulting in its political and administrative decentralisation. The first of 
these was the University Reform Act (LRU), which came into force in 1983, and was 
concerned with the organization of the universities and the modernization of their scientific 
work. The second was the Universities Act (LOU) introduced in 2001, which sought to 
implement quality assurance policies and prepare the Spanish university system for entry into 
the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). In 2007, the modification of the LOU made 
changes to the rectoral election procedures, faculty accreditation and selection, and the 
coordinating bodies of university policy. 
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 Since 2000, the Spanish university system has been one of the largest in Europe in terms of number of enrolled 
students, surpassed only by Germany, the UK, France and Poland. 
4
 The governance structure of the Spanish university system is based on a decentralised 
model that comprises three levels: the state, the autonomous regions, and the educational 
institutions4. The central government is responsible for its overall co-ordination, its 
international representation under a unique voice, and the control of scholarships and grants. 
Likewise, through the Ministry of Education, it establishes the regulatory framework for 
obtaining, issuing and validating academic degrees.  
The regional government is responsible for administering the HEIs within its territory. It 
establishes directives regarding staff (teaching and administrative) qualifications, quality 
measurement, salaries and the recruitment system5. The building of new educational facilities 
and the renewal of existing ones also fall under the control of the autonomous regions. 
Mechanisms of university funding are one of the main issues at this level of government.6 
Although over recent years there has been a convergence in the regional funding mechanisms, 
differences persist7. However, two common types of funding can be identified across regions: 
1) basic funding, which considers variables related to both demand and costs of production 
factors and 2) non-recurrent funding, which supports program-contracts tied to output-
performance, e.g. in terms of research outputs or graduation rates (Consejo de Coordinación 
Universitaria 2007). In order to illustrate the main regional features of budget allocation we 
describe two examples - Madrid and Catalonia, which represent about 34.6% of Spanish 
university expenditure and account for 31% of its university students. The Autonomous 
Community of Madrid allocates resources to universities according to the following model: 
59.5% to teaching8, 25.5% to research, 10% to enhance aspects such as teaching performance, 
undergraduate job placement, quality of services, and finally, 5% to accomplish other 
objectives. In turn, Catalonia’s funding model comprises five elements: 1) Fixed - lump-sum 
payment for each university, 2) Basic - linked to scale of university activity, 3) Derivative - 
policy promoting academic personnel, 4) Strategic – linked to objectives, and 5) Competition - 
through official announcements.  
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 In specific instances, the central government and the autonomous regions have delegated powers to city councils. 
This includes a wide range of responsibilities from providing information on the city’s educational institutions to 
the management of non-university institutions. 
5
 The central government also has a voice in the definition of categories and personnel salaries. 
6
 In 2005, for instance, 91.8% of public spending on tertiary education was allocated as direct subsidies to 
institutions, with only 8.2% going to student financial-aid (OECD 2010). 
7
 The existence of several models of funding across regions implies differences in the mechanisms of university 
expenditure allocation, which we take into account in the econometric analysis. 
8
 The amount of resources allocated to teaching corresponds to demand. Hence, degrees with low demand and high 
dispersion are penalized. 
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 Higher education regulations have granted autonomy to universities. This autonomy 
embraces the following powers: 1) drawing-up their statues and electing their institutional 
governing and representative bodies, 2) definition of their own structure, 3) organisation of 
educational programmes, 4) preparation and management of their own budgets, and 5) 
administration of assets. 
Given its importance for this study, mention should also be made of the way in which 
Spanish universities structure their degree courses. Prior to the Bologna reform, the degree 
structure included both short (first) and long (first and second) cycle courses. Short, first cycle 
programmes were more vocationally oriented with a duration of two to three years and led to a 
Diploma degree. About 35% of students were enrolled on short-cycle programmes in 20079 
(INE, 2009). Second cycle courses, lasting a further two years, commenced on completion of 
short programmes, and led to the awarding of a Bachelor’s degree. These long-cycle 
programmes were more academic, preparing students for entry into the professions (law, 
engineering, medicine, etc.). Third cycle courses are equivalent to the current PhD 
programmes.  
 
3. Data description and empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis is carried out at the university level for the period 1998-2008. We use 
data on the Spanish public university system, collected biannually by the Rector’s Conference 
of Spanish Universities (RCSE)10. This database contains detailed information on university 
performance such as enrolment, graduation, expenditure, investment, and faculty, among 
others. Private universities are excluded from our analysis for two reasons. First, the 
information available is more recent and, then, scarcer, which could give lead to degrees of 
freedom problems. Second, as Just and Huffman (2009) noted, there are major differences 
between public and private universities in terms of their funding, management structure, 
resource/budget constraints, social issues, and so forth. Therefore, in trying to avoid these 
problems and to reduce those associated with heterogeneity, our sample is restricted to the 
state’s public university system, i.e. 47 universities. In 2008, 86% of students were enrolled in 
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 This percentage has changed very little over the years. 
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 Although this represents an attempt to build a systematic database for the Spanish university system, and one 
that has improved over time, there are many missing values in the first years of data collection, which does not 
allow us to obtain more degrees of freedom. 
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 public universities. A major advantage of the data is that they offer a wide perspective of the 
Spanish University system, especially with regard to post-graduate students.  
 
3.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the overall weighted graduation rate11, which is calculated using the 
following expression 
  

	
  . 


 
where WGRit = overall weighted graduation rate12 of university i in year t, Gijt = number of 
graduates of university i, cycle j and year t. Eijt = number of students enrolled in first year of 
university i cycle j and year t-m13. Sijt = share of graduates of university i, cycle j and year t14. i 
= university, j= cycles (undergraduate – long and short cycle - and PhD), t = year. 
 The mean graduation rate during the period analysed was 66.2%. The minimum and 
maximum values were 32.2% and 98.4%, respectively. This measure showed huge variation 
both across universities and regions. Indeed, although there was a trend towards convergence 
across universities, the ratio between the highest graduation rate and the lowest during the 
whole period was three. In the case of the regions, two (Catalonia and Madrid) consistently 
performed better than the others, while the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands were placed 
at the other end of the distribution. Despite the general convergence noted - with very few 
variations, there was considerable persistence in the ranking occupied by each university over 
the period in terms of their graduation rates.  
 
3.2. Explanatory variables  
The explanatory variables can be classified into four groups: 1) expenditure variables, 2) 
university characteristics related to scale and technical orientation, 3) measures of input quality, 
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 The cohort-graduation rate is the usual measure of degree completion in the literature. For instance, Webber & 
Ehrenberg (2010) use the six-year graduation rate for students who entered the institution as full-time first-year 
students six years earlier. Other alternatives of widespread use are net or gross graduation rates, and 
Graduation/Successful completion. Calculation details can be seen in the OECD publication “Education at a 
Glance”. 
12
 Henceforth, graduation rate. 
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 When j= short cycle, m=3; if j= long cycle, m=5; when j= MSc, m=2; finally, if j=PhD, m=3.  
14
     , Gjit = number of graduates in cycle j, at university i in year t; Git = number of graduates at university 
i in year t. This term seeks to weight the duration of the different cycles. 
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 and 4) proxies of other university activities besides teaching15. In the first group we consider 
both the effect of total expenditures and their three main components on the graduation rate. 
These expenditure categories constitute the core of educational and general expenditures within 
the Spanish public universities16. The first category is made up of personnel expenditures, 
including total salary outlays and the fringe benefits of faculty and administrative staff. The 
average personnel expenditure per student enrolled in the sample was 3,053 € each year. This 
category grew steadily during the period of analysis, and represents 55.85% of total 
expenditures.  
 The second category is made up of financial aid to students, including scholarships and 
fellowships awarded to students such as grants-in-aid, trainee stipends, tuition and required fee 
waivers, and other monetary subsidies given to students. As discussed earlier, Spain’s Ministry 
of Education promotes and manages these grants, which are paid to the university or directly to 
the student. These expenditures averaged an annual 327.9 € per student enrolled. The third 
category comprises research and development (R&D) expenditures, including charges for 
activities specifically organized to produce research outcomes. The mean level of these 
expenditures was 918.2 €, representing 12% of total university expenditures. Finally, total 
expenditures are the sum of these three categories plus investment, capital transfers and 
financial operations. The mean level was 5,659.4 € per student enrolled each year. This variable 
presented a sustained increase during the period analysed (See Figure 1)17.  
In the case of the second group of variables, previous studies often include the number 
and the square of the number of undergraduate (Undergra_stuit) and graduate students 
(Grad_stuit) enrolled at the university (Groot et al. 1991; Longlong et al. 2009; Webber & 
Ehrenberg 2010). These variables are introduced separately to control for differences in costs of 
undergraduate and graduate education, and their squared terms to allow for economies of 
scale18. In addition, as a measure of family effort, the tuition fees (feesit) paid by students are 
included. These fees are fixed by the regional governments and are the same for all universities 
in that region, but vary across academic fields. We introduce a simple average of the public 
price of the teaching credit by university. Similarly, we include a further two variables to 
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 Table A1 depicts the details used to build the explanatory variables. 
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 All financial data used in the study are expressed in per enrolled-student terms and have been adjusted to 2001 
values. 
17
 In turn, Figure 2 shows the relationship between graduation rate and total expenditure per student enrolled in 
2004 and 2008. 
18
 Alternatively, some specifications include the total number of student (tot_stu it) which is the sum of 
Undergra_stu it and Grad_stu it. 
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 control for university characteristics: the share of students receiving financial support from the 
Ministry of Education (Supp_stuit) and the share of students enrolled on science and 
engineering courses (Sci_stuit). The former is included to control for differences in the number 
of fellowship recipients across universities, which are assigned according to family income and 
other socioeconomic characteristics; and, the latter in order to take into account the fact that 
each academic field has different associated costs. 
According to Dolan and Schmidt (1994), a model of higher education should reflect the 
broader perspective that the quality of output can influence the quality of inputs, and that 
certain institutional resources may themselves enhance the quality of the inputs. Hence, the 
third group of variables includes measures of student ability and faculty quality. The student 
abilityit is introduced through the minimum score required to gain admission to the university19. 
As a control for faculty quality, we use the ratio of the number of scientific articles published in 
JCR journals to full-time faculty (publiit)20. 
The last group of explanatory variables refers to university activities. These are 
generally classified into three main categories; teaching, research, and technology transfer 
(TT). Depending on its specific profile, each university assigns a different weight to each, 
which correlates with the amount of resources allocated. We introduce different indicators for 
each of these activities: the number of patent applications (Patit) for TT, and the above variable 
publiit for research. Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used.  
 
3.3. Empirical strategy  
In order to estimate the relationship between university characteristics and graduation rate, we 
specify a panel structure to reduce unobserved heterogeneity. A problem that can be addressed 
in this way is, for instance, the fact that the estimated effects of financial resources may be 
confounded by unobserved institutional characteristics. The function to be estimated can be 
written as: 
WGRit =  αi + τt + λj+ β1 Expendituresit + β2 Undergra_stuit + β3 Undergra_stu2it + β4 Grad_stuit 
             + β5 Grad_stu2it + feesit + γ2 Sci_stuit + γ3 Supp_stuit + γ1 abilityit + γ4 publiit + Patit + µ it 
 i=1,2,..., N universities, and t=1998, 2000, ..., 2008. 
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 An average of the 75th percentile of scores or those entering a first-year class was calculated. Data come from 
the Ministry of Education. Figure 3 provides scatter-plots of graduation rate and student ability in 2000 and 2002. 
20
 These data come from the information provided by the institute of documentary studies on science and 
technology. 
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  Expendituresit refer to the three expenditure categories mentioned above, which are 
expressed in terms of enrolled students. The inclusion of university fixed effects (αi) minimizes 
the influence of any unobserved variables that may be correlated with both the dependent 
variable and the disturbance term. Finally, τt and λj are time and regional dummies, N= 47 is the 
cross section and T= 6 the time-series sample size. 
Considerations of multicollinearity among different categories of expenditure preclude 
any attempt at including them within the same specification; hence, we run separate regressions 
for each. Panel estimations with both fixed (FEs) and random effects (REs) were carried out. A 
Robust-Hausman test was performed, indicating that differences between the coefficients of 
fixed and random effects are not systematic. Therefore, both procedures are appropriate. Since 
university policy varies across regions (i.e. the budget is allocated by the regional government), 
we prefer REs because they are more efficient and allow us to include a set of regional 
dummies21.  
Other empirical issues should be mentioned. First, the graduation rate is measured at 
three- and five-year intervals, but the resources required to achieve this outcome span multiple 
periods. In order to control for this and to capture the dynamic nature of the graduation rates, 
we consider resources expended over multiple years, as well as graduation rates from multiple 
cohorts. Second, all specifications include both year and university fixed effects. Hence, any 
university permanent characteristics, e.g. infrastructure quality, are controlled for by a set of 
university dummies. Third, data on personnel expenditure do not enable us to separate items 
out between teachers and administrative staff. In order to obtain reliable results, the student-
teacher ratio is adopted, which is a cleaner measure of university effort in terms of teaching 
personnel. Finally, information on R&D expenditures contains many errors and missing values. 
Conversely, the information on research outcomes - by which R&D activity can be assessed - is 
accurate. Therefore, the effects of university R&D on graduation rate are analyzed through 
research outcomes such as patents and publications.  
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 For sake of brevity some FE estimations are not reported here. They are, however, available from the authors 
upon request. 
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 4. Results 
4.1. University characteristics 
Two specifications are included. Regressors from two groups of explanatory variables are 
included in the first specification, i.e. expenditures and university characteristics. The other 
groups are introduced in the second specification (i.e. measures of input quality and proxies of 
other university activities). In addition, the number of students enrolled is divided between 
undergraduates and graduates and their square terms are also included. 
We present results separately for total expenditure (Table 1), student-teacher ratio 
(Table 2) and financial-aid to students (Table 3). The first general finding is that all regressors 
in the group of expenditure variables have a statistically significant effect on the graduation 
rate. Aside from the financial-aid results, the magnitude of the aforementioned coefficients is 
held relatively stable across specifications. Likewise, the student-teacher ratio coefficient is 
negative and always statistically significant at least at the one-percent level (see Table 2). 
Second, the total number of students (tot_stu) consistently shows a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the graduation rate. Third, the share of students on science and engineering 
courses (Sci_stu) and the measures of input quality (student ability and public) do not have any 
effect on the dependent variable. This last result might indicate that student ability is randomly 
distributed and plays no role in the determination of graduation rates. This being the case, 
graduation rates should be explained by university characteristics. 
Since the column 7 specification in Tables 1, 2 and 3 includes all the groups of 
regressors and a set of regional dummies22, the following remarks and the calculations on the 
magnitude of impact are based on that specification. In the case of the relationship between 
total expenditure and the graduation rate, the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant across specifications (see Table 1). Hence, a one standard deviation increase in total 
expenditures leads to a rise in the graduation rate of about 4.8 percentage points. Supp_stu has a 
positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. Regressors from the other groups of 
variables do not have any effect on graduation rates. Although this might seem somewhat 
unusual, it is, in fact, in line with previously reported findings (Weber, 2010). 
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 As mentioned, these dummies seek to control for differences in university policy across regions. 
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 When the student-teacher ratio is included, a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient is obtained (see Table 2)23. An increase by one standard deviation reduces the 
graduation rate by about 9.5 percentage points. Undergad_stu2 and pat show a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the graduation rate.  
Finally, expenditure on student financial-aid presents the following features24. First, the 
estimated coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation increase in this item leads to a rise 
in the graduation rate of about 4.9 percentage points. Second, the number of undergraduate 
students (Undergrad_stu) and its squared value (Undergrad_stu2) are statistically significant, 
and their signs (negative and positive, respectively) present a U-shape (See column 7, Table 3). 
It would seem, therefore, that there are two ranks of university size at which the graduation rate 
presents higher levels. Moreover, in the case of small universities, increasing the number of 
undergraduate students leads to a reduction in the graduation rate. By contrast, at larger 
universities, increasing the number of students can lead to a rise in the graduation rate. Third, in 
line with the results in Table 2, pat is again positive and statistically significant at least at the 
10 percent level. This result can be interpreted as showing the complementarity effect among 
university tasks. 
 
4.2 Regional characteristics 
The expansion of the Spanish university system and its geographical distribution has sought to 
introduce regional balance. As discussed, universities can make a significant contribution to the 
regional economies by generating human capital, since better regional economic performance is 
expected as a result of graduates joining the labour force. At the same time, features of the 
regional economy can affect university performance. This section analyses the impact of 
regional context on graduation rates. The key point is that, since the university framework 
remains unchanged across the period of analysis, regional socio-economic characteristics, 
together with university characteristics, might explain differences between university 
outcomes. We assume that the graduation rate (GR) of university i in year t is modelled as a 
function of university characteristics U and regional characteristics R.  
GRit = f (Uit , Rit) 
The difficulty lies in the fact that it is not easy to find regional variables that are not 
correlated with university characteristics. We perform this analysis focusing solely on regional 
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 The variable fee was dropped from the regressions in Table 2 due to problems of collinearity. 
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 fees and supp_stu were excluded because of collinearity. 
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 characteristics. Furthermore, total university expenditure, the number of students enrolled and 
university fixed-effects are included. 
We add associated variables to two groups of regional features: demographic structure 
and labour market25. In the case of the latter, we introduce regional employment since it 
influences enrolment and persistence (Bedard & Herman, 2008; Mollick & Mora, 2010). 
Although it is likely that students (and families) consider the unemployment rate when making 
decisions over education plans, it is no less likely that the level of employment is a good 
indicator of labour market performance and, therefore, it is taken into account by families. The 
assumption here is that once students have started higher education, the probability of 
persistence, and then graduation, correlate highly with the level of employment in the economy. 
To capture this effect, we use the employment in province i in year t, for 16- to 24-year-olds26.  
The graduation rate could be affected by the regional demographic structure through the 
following mechanism. Moretti (2004) indicates that the US labour force is characterized by a 
long-run trend of increasing education, with younger cohorts being better educated than their 
older counterparts27. In addition, Ciccone and Peri (2006) argue that cities with a larger share of 
older workers in a certain decade will experience a greater increase in average schooling in 
subsequent years. In line with these arguments, we use the share of population with tertiary 
education28 (40Greater) and the share of old workers in the previous decade (OLD). Here the 
expected effect is that provinces in which these shares are higher will obtain a higher 
graduation rate. Finally, as in the preceding analysis, a set of regional dummies is included. 
To deal with collinearity between Employment and 40Greater two specifications were 
introduced. The main findings can be summarized as follows. After controlling for regional 
characteristics in the model, the total university expenditure maintains a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with the graduation rate. In keeping with this, the total 
number of enrolled students once again positively affects the dependent variable (see Table 4). 
In the case of the influence of regional characteristics on the graduation rate, three 
results are worth stressing. First, the coefficient of 40Greater is negative and statistically 
significant (See columns 1 to 3 in Table 4). Second, Employment has a negative and 
                                                 
25
 A third variable related to the standard of living was also considered, namely, per capita GDP. Nonetheless, it 
was excluded for problems of collinearity. 
26
 These data are taken from the Economically Active Population Survey conducted by the INE. 
27
 OECD data (Education at a Glance, 2010) show that in Spain, the proportion of people aged 25 to 34 that have 
attained tertiary education qualifications more than doubles the number in the 55- to 64-year-old cohort (39% and 
16% in Spain compared to the OECD average of 35% and 20% respectively). 
28
 Specifically, we include the share of population with higher education and aged over 40. 
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 statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. This suggests that once students enrol 
at university, the probability of persistence, and subsequently of graduation, will be lower if 
regional employment presents a good performance. Finally, OLD seems to have no effect on 
the graduation rate, being significant only in the case of the random-effect model without 
regional dummies (see column 5) 29. 
 
5. Empirical Extensions 
OLS estimates provide the average effect of an explanatory variable over the entire distribution 
of an outcome variable. Nonetheless, in some contexts, this summary statistic may not be 
representative of the relationship in any one part of the outcome distribution. To look beyond 
the underlying questions of economic and policy interest concerning graduation rates, we use a 
quantile framework to characterize their entire distribution. Quantile regressions are often used 
to show differential impacts of the variables of interest throughout the outcome distribution.  
We apply a new unconditional quantile estimation technique for panel data based on 
Powell (2011) and Firpo et al. (2009)30. The method consists of running a regression of a 
transformation - the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) - of the outcome variable on the 
explanatory variables. The basic difference between conditional quantile treatment effects 
(QTEs) and unconditional QTEs is that the former are defined conditionally on the value of the 
regressors, whereas unconditional effects summarize the causal effect of a treatment for the 
entire population (Frölich & Melly 2010).  
Two categories of university expenditure were analysed through unconditional QTEs: 
total and financial-aid to students. We introduce a fixed-effect model to control for time- 
invariant unobserved university heterogeneity. 
The results show that the relationship between total university expenditures and the 
graduation rate is only statistically significant at the low quantiles i.e. q=0.20, 0.40 (see Table 
5). In turn, estimates of the coefficient of financial-aid to students lead us to conclude that, 
aside from the lowest quantile i.e. q=0.20, there is a strong relationship with the graduation 
rate, across the distribution (see Table 5). Likewise, the magnitude of coefficients presents an 
                                                 
29
 In a second step, to reduce any suspicions of endogeneity problems, we re-estimated this last specification 
introducing the share from the previous decade. Our results were very similar and are not reported here for reasons 
of space. 
30
 We adopt the second estimator (RIF-Logit regression), its main advantage being that it allows heterogeneous 
marginal effects. 
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 inverted-U shape when we move to the right-hand side of the distribution. A further pattern that 
emerges from this exercise is that the standard errors are smaller for lower quantiles than they 
are for the upper ones, reflecting greater precision in that part of the distribution. 
These findings can be attributed to following circumstances. First, the results seem to 
show that that there is a point up to which the graduation rate can be increased via university 
expenditure. From that point, expenditure has a reduced capacity to bring about better 
outcomes. Here, any possible advances are determined by the students themselves and may be 
triggered by financial support to the students. Therefore, a well-designed fellowship program 
seems to play an important role in degree completion. 
Second, from a regional perspective, we identify a weak level of persistence among 
universities occupying the lowest ranks (in terms of graduation rates). It would seem feasible 
for them to escape from these positions by adopting a policy that combines elements of 
university expenditure and student fellowship programs. This would seem to constitute a more 
effective strategy for reduce disparities between regions in terms of their university 
performance.  
Like the current national fellowship program run by Spain’s ministry of education, 
financial support to students should be tied to educational achievements as well as regional 
socio-economic characteristics. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Graduation rates remain one of the most frequently applied measures of institutional 
performance and continue to draw the attention of both academics and policymakers. This 
paper has sought, in the first place, to analyse university characteristics that affect the 
graduation rate, and secondly, to determine whether regional characteristics influence 
university performance in terms of graduation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
economic study conducted in Spain to consider institutional characteristics and regional 
features. 
The answers to the research questions formulated here help further our understanding of 
the ways in which institutional and regional features can affect university outcomes. Our results 
are largely consistent with findings in recent studies in related fields. University expenditure 
has been a key determinant of the graduation rate in Spain over the last decade. Moreover, 
15
 results obtained here through quantile regression analysis show that a policy of increasing 
university expenditure only makes sense for universities with low graduation rates. Universities 
whose graduation rate does not belong to the 20th percentile can though improve their ranking 
by raising financial-aid to students. Yet, these questions require more careful attention since 
any expenditure increase needs to be tied to improvements in quality and efficiency. 
The analysis also shows that it is not only the amount of university expenditure that is 
important, but also university research performance. Indeed, there would seem to be a 
complementarity effect between their teaching and research activities.  
Future research might take the following directions. First, although high graduation 
rates have been viewed as a good indicator of institutional excellence, it should also be 
recognized that they reflect admission standards, the academic strength of the enrolled students, 
and the resources that institutions can devote to instruction, remediation, and retention. The 
influence of these factors should, therefore, be taken into account. Second, measuring the 
quality of both inputs and outputs is important when analysing higher education; thus, quality 
measures need to be incorporated. Third, when the data sources so allow it, information at the 
institutional level could be expanded to include a student-level component, which would serve 
to unite the two types of study currently in vogue. 
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 Figure 1  
Evolution University total expenditure per enrolled student31 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Graduation rate and per capita expenditure  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Graduation rate and student ability  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Each point in this figure represents an individual-year pair 
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 Table 1 Econometric estimates: Total expenditure and graduation rate 
 
 Pooled Panel 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) FE (4) RE (5) RE (6) RE (7) RE 
        
Total expenditure it 0.024*** 0.023** 0.023* 0.024*** 0.022** 0.027*** 0.022** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Sci_stu it 0.036 0.056 -0.253 0.026 0.024 0.126 0.053 
 (0.055) (0.070) (0.427) (0.071) (0.056) (0.082) (0.071) 
Supp_stu it 0.662* 0.813** 0.483 0.204 0.584 0.447 0.792** 
 (0.355) (0.323) (0.522) (0.258) (0.356) (0.278) (0.331) 
Fees it -0.049 -0.044 -0.069* 0.002 -0.056 0.014 -0.045 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.036) (0.011) (0.036) (0.010) (0.029) 
Undergra_stu it  -0.007    -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.005)    (0.004) (0.005) 
Undergra_stu2 it  0.106    0.101 0.109 
  (0.068)    (0.067) (0.069) 
Grad_stu it  0.021    0.013 0.016 
 
 (0.023)    (0.022) (0.023) 
Grad_stu2
 it  -2.265    -2.752 -2.056 
  (2.193)    (2.216) (2.231) 
Student Ability it  -0.003    -0.011 0.001 
  (0.021)    (0.022) (0.022) 
Publi it  0.065    0.016 0.066 
  (0.079)    (0.075) (0.081) 
Pat it  0.002    -0.000 0.002 
  (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002) 
Tot_stu
 it 0.017***  0.113* 0.016** 0.018***   
 (0.006)  (0.059) (0.007) (0.006)   
Constant 0.702** 0.736** 1.022** 0.387** 0.849** 0.282 0.736** 
 (0.297) (0.291) (0.484) (0.164) (0.347) (0.196) (0.297) 
        
University fixed-effects Not Not Yes Not Not Not Not 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Not Not Yes Not Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.41 0.16 0.13 0.39 0.21 0.41 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the graduation rate at university i in year t. Total expenditure it is the sum of 
expenditures of personnel, financial-aid to students and R&D, plus investment, capital transfers and financial 
operations. Sci_stuit is the share of students in science and engineering. Supp_stuit is the share of students with 
financial support from the Ministry of Education. feesit are tuition fees. Undergra_stuit and Undergra_stu2it are the 
number and the square of undergraduate students. Grad_stuit and Grad_stu2it are the number and the square of 
graduate students enrolled at the university. student abilityit is the minimum score required to gain admission to the 
university. publiit is the ratio of the number of scientific articles published in JCR journals to full-time faculty. 
Tot_stu
 it is the sum of Undergra_stu it and Grad_stu it. Pat it is the number of patent applications.  
Robust standard errors clustered at university level are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote the significance at 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. Number of observations: 217. Number of Universities: 46. Year effects are 
included in all models. The expenditure variables are expressed in 2001 Euros and per student enrolled.  
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 Table 2 Econometric estimates: Personnel expenditure and graduation rate 
 
 Pooled Panel 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) FE (4) RE (5) RE (6) RE (7) RE 
 
       
Student-teacher ratio it -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Sci_stu it 0.019 0.045 -0.317 -0.007 0.006 0.070 0.040 
 (0.043) (0.069) (0.235) (0.057) (0.040) (0.077) (0.068) 
Supp_stu it 0.326 0.553* 0.189 0.225 0.255 0.439** 0.460 
 (0.346) (0.310) (0.423) (0.179) (0.313) (0.207) (0.357) 
Undergra_stu it  -0.007*    -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.004)    (0.004) (0.004) 
Undergra_stu2 it  0.116*    0.114* 0.123* 
  (0.066)    (0.066) (0.071) 
Grad_stu it  0.003    -0.018 -0.009 
 
 (0.022)    (0.021) (0.022) 
Grad_stu2
 it  -1.590    -0.864 -1.008 
  (2.082)    (2.186) (2.153) 
Student Ability it  0.002    0.001 0.007 
  (0.020)    (0.021) (0.022) 
Publi it  0.105    0.099 0.114 
  (0.070)    (0.068) (0.075) 
Pat it  0.003*    0.002 0.003* 
  (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002) 
Tot_stu
 it 0.014***  0.100*** 0.016** 0.016***   
 (0.005)  (0.034) (0.007) (0.005)   
Constant 0.875*** 0.901*** 0.853*** 0.906*** 0.876*** 0.904*** 0.829*** 
 (0.152) (0.218) (0.195) (0.079) (0.156) (0.169) (0.234) 
        
University fixed-effects Not Not Yes Not Not Not Not 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Not Not Yes Not Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.35 0.41 0.14 0.14 0.35 0.23 0.41 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the graduation rate at university i in year t. Student-teacher ratio
 it is the ratio of 
full-time equivalent students and the number of full-time equivalent teachers. Sci_stuit is the share of students in 
science and engineering. Supp_stuit is the share of students with financial support from the Ministry of Education.  
Undergra_stuit and Undergra_stu2it are the number and the square of undergraduate students. Grad_stuit and 
Grad_stu2it are the number and the square of graduate students enrolled at the university. student abilityit is the 
minimum score required to gain admission to the university. publiit is the ratio of the number of scientific articles 
published in JCR journals to full-time faculty. Tot_stu
 it is the sum of Undergra_stu it and Grad_stu it. Pat it is the 
number of patent applications.  
Robust standard errors clustered at university level are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote the significance at 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. Number of observations: 217. Number of Universities: 46. Year effects are 
included in all models. The expenditure variables are expressed in 2001 Euros and per student enrolled. 
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 Table 3 Econometric estimates: Financial-aid to student and graduation rate 
 
 Pooled Panel 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) FE (4) RE (5) RE (6) RE (7) RE 
        
Financial-aid it 0.257* 0.470*** 0.359** 0.116 0.294** 0.137 0.323*** 
 (0.131) (0.171) (0.147) (0.097) (0.125) (0.104) (0.116) 
Sci_stu it 0.052 0.044 -0.332 0.054 0.040 0.140 0.027 
 (0.051) (0.087) (0.316) (0.074) (0.048) (0.096) (0.080) 
Undergra_stu it  -0.011**    -0.011** -0.009* 
  (0.005)    (0.005) (0.005) 
Undergra_stu2 it  0.135*    0.156** 0.123* 
  (0.069)    (0.078) (0.071) 
Grad_stu it  0.044    0.028 0.028 
 
 (0.031)    (0.027) (0.028) 
Grad_stu2
 it  -4.159    -3.716 -3.176 
  (2.714)    (2.705) (2.649) 
Student Ability it  -0.003    0.018 0.008 
  (0.023)    (0.027) (0.026) 
Publi it  -0.082    0.100 0.018 
  (0.136)    (0.088) (0.093) 
Pat it  0.002    0.001 0.003* 
  (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002) 
Tot_stu
 it 0.012*  0.051 0.013 0.014**   
 (0.006)  (0.039) (0.008) (0.006)   
Constant 0.477*** 0.533*** 0.551*** 0.553*** 0.461*** 0.495** 0.462** 
 (0.076) (0.176) (0.176) (0.063) (0.073) (0.203) (0.200) 
        
University fixed-effects Not Not Yes Not Not Not Not 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Not Not Yes Not Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.38 0.10 0.09 0.33 0.14 0.40 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the graduation rate at university i in year t. Financial-aid it refers scholarships and 
fellowships awarded to students such as grants-in-aid, trainee stipends, tuition and required fee waivers, and other 
monetary subsidies given to students. Sci_stuit is the share of students in science and engineering. Undergra_stuit 
and Undergra_stu2it are the number and the square of undergraduate students. Grad_stuit and Grad_stu2it are the 
number and the square of graduate students enrolled at the university. student abilityit is the minimum score 
required to gain admission to the university. publiit is the ratio of the number of scientific articles published in JCR 
journals to full-time faculty. Tot_stu
 it is the sum of Undergra_stu it and Grad_stu it. Pat it is the number of patent 
applications.  
Robust standard errors clustered at university level are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote the significance at 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. Number of observations: 217. Number of Universities: 46. Year effects are 
included in all models. The expenditure variables are expressed in 2001 Euros and per student enrolled. 
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Table 4 Panel estimations: Regional characteristics and graduation rate 
 
 FE RE RE FE RE RE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total expenditure it 0.019** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.018* 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Tot_stu
 it 0.084** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.086** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (0.037) (0.007) (0.005) (0.042) (0.006) (0.005) 
40greater it -0.662** -0.237*** -0.512**    
 (0.307) (0.081) (0.215)    
OLD
 it    0.582 1.259*** 0.998 
    (2.085) (0.422) (0.720) 
Employment
 it    -0.139** -0.015 -0.043** 
    (0.060) (0.011) (0.018) 
Constant 0.401*** 0.432*** 0.443*** 0.359 0.235*** 0.296** 
 (0.125) (0.062) (0.066) (0.425) (0.082) (0.136) 
       
Regional dummies Not Not Yes Not Not Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.20 0.33 0.11 0.21 0.34 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the graduation rate at university i in year t. Total expenditure it is the sum of 
expenditures of personnel, financial-aid to student and R&D, plus investment, capital transfers and financial 
operations. Tot_stu
 it is the sum of Undergra_stu it and Grad_stu it. 40greater it is the share of population with 
tertiary education and aged over to 40 at province i. OLD
 it the share of old workers in the previous decade. 
Employment
 it is the employment at province i. 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote the significance at 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. Number of observations: 217. Number of Universities: 46. Year effects are 
included in all models. The expenditure variables are expressed in 2001 Euros and per student enrolled. Columns 1 
and 4 show fixed-effect models, other columns show random-effect ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Fixed-effects quantile regression results 
 
 20th 40th 60th 80th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Total expenditure 0.011* 0.013* 0.002 0.024 
Std. Error (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.016) 
     
Financial-aid to student 0.146 0.448** 0.573*** 0.388** 
Std. Error (0.150) (0.172) (0.176) (0.194) 
     
 
Notes: the dependent variable is the graduation rate at university i in year t. 
Robust standard errors clustered at university level are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote the significance at 
90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. Number of observations: 217. Number of Universities: 46. Year effects are 
included in all models. The expenditure variables are expressed in 2001 Euros and per student enrolled.  
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 Appendix  
 
Table A1 List of variables 
 
Variable Description 
  
Overall Weighted-Graduation rate it Overall Weighted-Graduation rate of university i at year t 
Total expenditure it Sum of personnel, financial-aid to student and R&D, plus investment, 
capital transfers and financial operations 
Personnel expenditure it Total salary outlays and fringe benefits of faculty and administrative 
staff 
Financial-aid
 
 it Refers scholarships and fellowships awarded to students such as 
grants-in-aid, trainee stipends, tuition and required fee waivers, and 
other monetary subsidies given to students. 
R&D expenditure it charges for activities specifically organized to produce research 
outcomes 
Student-teacher ratio
 it is obtained by dividing the number of full-time equivalent students by 
the number of full-time equivalent teachers 
Undergra_stu it Undergraduate students 
Undergra_stu2 it Squared of undergraduate students 
Grad_stu it Graduate students 
Grad_stu2
 it Squared of graduate students 
Tot_stu
 it Sum of Undergra_stu it and Grad_stu it 
Fees it Weighted average of tuition fees by university 
Supp_stu it Student percentage with financial support of ministry of education 
Sci_stu it Share of students in science and engineering degrees 
Student Ability it Minimum score to access to the university.  Average of the 75th 
percentile of scores by university’s entering first-year class 
Publi it the ratio of the number of scientific articles published in JCR journals 
to full-time faculty 
Pat it The number of patent applications 
 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics  
 
  Standard Deviation   
 Mean overall between within Min Max 
Overall Weighted-Graduation rate it 0.6625 0.1525 0.0828 0.0955 0.3219 0.9846 
Total expenditure it 5.6594 2.1749 1.3422 1.7207 2.1239 21.9961 
Personnel expenditure it 3.0537 0.9510 0.5107 0.8051 0.7892 5.8690 
Financial-aid to student it 0.3279 0.1531 0.1463 0.0715 0.0248 0.9322 
R&D expenditure it 0.9182 0.6244 0.4898 0.3968 0.1426 3.4925 
Student-teacher ratio
 it 15.5202 3.9594 2.3347 3.2129 9.1824 51.5857 
Undergra_stu it 24.3505 16.0573 15.9428 2.8615 3.2230 82.5000 
Undergra_stu2 it 849.8688 1133.1630 1115.4510 248.9346 10.3877 6806.2500 
Grad_stu it 1.4041 1.5132 1.4828 0.3549 0 11.0620 
Grad_stu2
 it 4.2531 13.2817 12.6018 4.4635 0 122.3679 
Fees it 10.3834 1.4475 1.0995 0.9512 0 15.1156 
Supp_stu it 0.1672 0.0537 0.0504 0.0195 0.0135 0.3459 
Sci_stu it 0.4478 0.1875 0.1873 0.0269 0.0097 1 
Student Ability it 6.5767 0.5576 0.4817 0.2867 5 7.9950 
Publi it 0.3305 0.1531 0.1346 0.0751 0.0601 0.8880 
Pat it 7.2128 7.5168 6.6258 3.6538 0 41 
 
N = 271, n = 47, T=6. All financial data used in the study are expressed in terms of per enrolled student and have 
been adjusted to 2001 values.
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 Table A3 Recent studies on the relationship between regional development and human capital 
 
Studies Dependent 
variables 
Explanatory var. Methodology Unit of 
analysis 
Period 
Artís et al. 2010 1. ∆ Productivity 
2. ∆ GDP per capita 
Stock of physical capital, Stock of 
human capital (primary, high school, 
Tertiary) 
Spatial panel data. Weighted matrix 
(distances between province 
capitals) 
 
Spanish 
provinces 
1980 – 
2007  
 
Abel & Gabe 
2010 
GDP per capita 
(average 2000 – 
2005) 
Human Capital = The proportion of 
each metropolitan area’s working-
age population with a college degree, 
Physical capital investment. 
Cross section, Instrumental 
Variables: Land-grant university. 
US 
Metropolitan 
areas 
2000 - 
2005 
Coulombe & 
Trembaly 2007 
Provincial Per 
capita income 
HK measured by: 1. University 
achievement 
2. Indicator of skill based on literacy 
test scores. Year of Schooling 
Mincerian estimates. 
Time series and cross section.  
GLS, FGLS. Instrumental 
variables. 
Canadian 
provinces 
 
Ciccone & Peri 
2006 
Average-schooling 
externalities 
∆ in average schooling  
∆ in av. experience 
Theoretical model, Mincerian 
approach (identifying HK 
externalities) 
US City 1970-1990 
Florida et al. 
2008 
1. Productivity 
(measure by Wages) 
2.  
Income 
Human capital, creative class, 
technology variables, tolerance and 
related variable, universities (# of 
university faculty per capita), 
consumer services (amenities). 
 
Cross section, Structural equation 
model.  
What are the factors that shape the 
distribution of human capital in the 
first place? 
US 
metropolitan 
regions (331) 
2000 
Hanushek & 
Kimko 2000 
Productivity and 
economic growth. 
Labour force quality (based on 
student cognitive performance) 
Equation system to explain: 1. 
Economic growth. 2. Resources 
devoted to schools & human capital 
production. 
3. labor-force quality 
Countries  
(drop out) 
 
Mollick et al. 
2010 
∆ population (or 
employment) 
County logarithmic 
population density 
growth between 
Share of individuals in the county: 
Youth, Mid, Old. 
Argument: Cities with a larger share 
of older workers in 1970 experienced 
a greater increase in average 
IV, Cross section. 
 
 
Texas counties 
(254) 
1980, 
1990, 2000 
census 
25
 1980-1990 and 
between 1990-2000 
schooling in subsequent years. 
 
Moretti 2004 Wages 
 
 Cross section and panel data. IV: 
1. Lagged of age structure, 2. Land-
grant university 
US cities (201) 
NxT= 44891 
1979 - 
1994 
census 
Shapiro 2006 Growth in: 
Productivity, 
employment, wage, 
rental price, house 
value. 
Share college educated. Dependent 
variables alternate as explanatory in 
other regressions. 
(a simple neoclassical growth model 
is calibrated) 
IV: Land-grand colleges and 
Universities (1862), compulsory 
schooling laws. 
US Cities  
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